Brokendad,
Under the children's law reform act, Ontario, you do have the right to make inquires in regards to the health and welfare of your child,
Moreover, it is the same right as the other parent! This inquiry would include and health professional or any other individual, institution that has dealings with your child.
If your ex is not co-operating, your evidence is already in the communication book! that an inquiry has been asked!
One of the things the courts will look at is how a custodial parent has acted and ignoring matters that effect the health and welfare of your child is abuse in itself.
In the following jurisprudence;
http://www.canlii.org/on/cas/oncj/2004/2004oncj157.html
Paragraph 12
[12] The law that she needed to keep in mind is essentially this:
(a)
Before the parental separation, she and the father had equal entitlement to the custody of this child. When they separated and the child continued in her care with the consent or acquiescence of Mr. J.W., she gained the authority temporarily to exercise the rights and responsibilities of custody until a separation agreement or court order provided otherwise. See subsection 20(7). Mr. J.W.’s exercise of his entitlement to custody and the incidents of custody were suspended, not ended. Such suspension remains in place only until a separation agreement or court order provides otherwise. See subsection 20(4). The sort of separation agreement meant by this provision is one that is a valid separation agreement under Part IV of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F-3, as amended. See subsection 18(1). There is no such agreement in this case.
(b) She was given an ex parte order for temporary custody of M.P.R.W. when she first came before the court on 8 January 2001. At the best of times, temporary orders are temporary solutions for a child’s ongoing care pending resolution of the court case. Those orders are made on partial and untested evidence. A temporary order made without proper notice of the motion to the child’s other parent is the most temporary of temporary orders, resting as it does on evidence not even exposed at that point to the other parent.
(c) Ms. Z. has enjoyed her temporary custody over such a protracted time, not because judges in the course of judicial case management have decided in her favour on the ultimate outcome of what is in this child’s best interests, as she argues, but because the child’s father has supported the child’s remaining in her primary care.
(d) A custody order is not a right granted for the benefit of a parent. It is a legal mechanism through which a parent discharges responsibilities to the child and it is a heavy responsibility. The Act requires the person entrusted with custody, whether it be under the authority of a temporary or a final order, to exercise those rights and responsibilities, not in the parent’s best interests, but in the ongoing best interests of the child — see subsection 20(2) — and in tune with statutory and court-ordered obligations that are part and parcel of that custody responsibility.
e) Not suspended, when parents separate and the child remains in the care of one of them, is the other parent’s entitlement to access to their child — an entitlement that includes the right to visit with and be visited by the child. See subsection 20(4) and subsection 20(5).
Ms. A.Z. has had no right, by virtue of her temporary custody order or in the period prior to any court order, to deny the child access to his father or to dictate the terms of that child’s access
(f) Not suspended when parents separate and their child remains in the care of one of them is the entitlement of the other parent to information bearing on the child — an entitlement identical to that of the parent with actual custody to make inquiries and be given information as to the health, education and welfare of the child. See subsection 20(4) and subsection 20(5).
Ms. A.Z. has had no right, by virtue of her temporary custody, to withhold information bearing of the child’s well being from the father.
and paragraphs 63, 64, 65 and 66
4.7: On the Mother’s Management of Her Information Sharing Responsibility
[63] Over the course of this litigation, this mother has shown no particular interest in keeping the father in the information “loop” on matters affecting the wellbeing of their son. It was her evidence that the father has never asked. On the whole of the evidence, I find that he could certainly have been asking more often, but I am satisfied that he did attempt to gain information and was deflected. His outreach to the child’s physician earlier in the case produced no information but rather a response that suggested a real animosity towards him. The court had given him opportunity to get to know the child’s day-care providers when he collected M.P.R.W. for access. That was scuttled when the child was removed from that day care. It was evident in the trial that this father had had no meaningful information about the interventions that awaited M.P.R.W. at the close of the trial. Not even the identity of certain of the clinicians was made known to him, or indeed to the court, until the trial was stood down so that the mother could obtain the information by telephone.
[64] I did not conclude, on the whole of the evidence, that Mr. J.W. was disinterested in the M.P.R.W.’s well being, as the mother had argued. He did choose not to battle with Ms. A.Z. for information about M.P.R.W. It was not unreasonable, with so much else in dispute, to proceed on the basis that, as she learned to share M.P.R.W., she would learn to share information about M.P.R.W. The result for the boy was nonetheless a father who had no input into the various medical and other interventions arranged for him by his mother, no information flowing to the father about the need for those interventions, no opportunity for him to be supported through those interventions by his father and a father flying blind on what, if anything, apart from what the mother was demanding of him, the child needed from him during their times of access in relation to those interventions; whether it be special care, special foods, special provisions.
[65] I am satisfied by the evidence that the father did ask for information about the well being of this boy and was deflected to the point where he chose not to press the issue. It did not signal that he was not worried about the child.
[66]
A reasonable parent, centred on the child’s well being, does not exclude the other parent from information bearing on the child’s well being. To do that suggests that there is something secretive about the information. Concern about secrecy and what may be underlying the secrecy festers over time. This child needs and is entitled to have openness between his parents on all matters bearing on his well being.